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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MIL.A .. N D. SMITH, for and on behalf 
of KATHLEEN MAY SMITH and 
MICHAEL JAY SMITH, minor chil-
dren of Roland B. Smith, Deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
THE INDUSTRIAL CO~IMISSION Case No. 8455 
OF UTAH, SMITH CANNING COM-
pANY, BOX ELDER PACKING 
CORPORATION, SMITH FROZEN 





The purported statement of facts set forth in the 
plaintiff's brief, is neither complete nor accurate. Many 
of the asserted propositions of fact, find no support in the 
record. In other instances, strained inferences have been 
placed on the evidence in the record, to arrive at conclu-
sions favorable to the plaintiff. Rather than point out 
in detail wherein we disagree with the plaintiff's state-
ment of the facts, we are setting forth in full the facts 
as revealed by the record. It may be pertinent to observe 
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here, that the facts are substantially without dispute, 
and are established entirely by witnesses called by the 
plaintiff, and favorable to him. They are as follows: 
The Smith family operates a far flung industrial 
empire in the canning and food processing industry ex-
tending over the states of Utah, Idaho and Oregon. The 
Smith interests in Utah consist of The Box Elder Pack-
ing Corporation, and Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., both of 
which are Utah Corporations, having their plants at 
Brigham City, Utah; the Smith Canning Company, a 
·utah corporation with offices and plant at Clearfield~ 
Utah; the Smith Sales Company, a co-partnership, 
having its principal office at Clearfield, Utah, (and a 
branch office at Pendleton, Oregon); a warehouse at 
West Point, Utah; Intermountain Frozen Foods, Inc., 
located at 369 Z.C.!i.I. Avenue; and National Brokerage 
Company, a co-partnership, 'vith offices in Clearfield, 
Utah. (R. 36-40). All of these separate enterprises were 
originally named as parties defendant, along with N a-
tiona! Surety Corporation, the con1pensation insurance 
carrier for all of them. (R. 21, 2-!). However, as the 
evidence developed, it readily became .apparent that the 
Warehouse at West Point; Intern1ountain Frozen Foods, 
Inc., and National Brokerage Company, 'Yere improperly 
joined, and they were ellininated as parties defendant. 
(R. 36-38). At the conclusion of the original hearing, 
it w.as made to appear that Smith Sales Company had not 
complied with the provisions of Sec. ±5-1-43, Subdivision 
( 4) U.C.A. 1953, and therefore, there could be no right 
of compensation fro1n that defendant. (R. 85). In addi-
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tion to the Utah operations above set forth, there is an 
Idaho corporation, Inland Empire Foods Con1pany, and 
t'vo Oregon corporations, Smith Frozen Foods of Oregon, 
Inc., and Smith Canning Comp.any of Oregon. (R. 7). In 
addition, as above noted, the Smith Sales Company main-
tained an office at Pendleton, Oregon. 
Roland B. Smith, out of whose death the present 
claim arises, actively participated in all of these enter-
prises. He was president and general manager of both 
of the Brigham City corporations (R. 26, 27) ; he was 
vice president of Smith Canning Company (R. 29); and 
he was a general partner in the Smith Sales Company. 
(R. 29). In addition, he was an officer or director in the 
Idaho and Oregon corporations. (R. 55, 56). 
All of the Smith corporate enterprises in Utah, as 
well as the corporate organizations in Idaho and Oregon, 
are engaged in the production of packaged foods for sale 
on the market. Box Elder Packing Corporation and 
Smith Canning Company are engaged in canning fruits 
and vegetables, and Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., is en-
gaged in preparing frozen foods for the market. (R. 41-
43). 
The Smith Sales Company 'v.as a co-partnership, con-
sisting of the deceased, and his two brothers and a sister. 
(R. 7-8, 66). At the inception of the partnership, the 
deceased owned an equal interest with his two brothers, 
each of them o'vning a 28% interest, and the sister own-
ing a 16% interest. (R. 7-8). As appears from the Arti-
eles of Partnership, and the amendments thereto, the 
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proportionate interests of the partners changed from 
time to time, and at the time of his death, the deceased 
owned a 24% interest, and each of his brothers owned a 
30% interest, the sister retaining her 16% interest. (R. 
14). 
As president and general manager of the two Brig-
ham City corporations, the deceased had the overall su-
pervision of their operations. This included the obtain-
ing of contracts with fruit and vegetable producers, pur-
chasing necessary materials and supplies, supervision of 
maintenance at the plants, supervision of personnel, and 
overall supervision of the operations of those corpora--
tions. (R. 27-29, 52-54, 75-76). As vice president of Smith 
Canning Company his duties were largely administrative 
and fiscal. (R. 29, 75-76). Although he was not a manag-
ing partner of the sales company, he was a general part-
ner and he consulted 'vith the other partners in decisions 
relating to policy. (R. 10, 29, 76). He also shared in the 
profits, proportionately to his capital investment. (R. 9, 
55, 78). 
Paragraph 9 of the partnership agree1nent provided 
that profits and losses 'vould be pro-rated according to 
the capital interest of the partners. (R. 9). Paragraph 
12, provided that e.ach of the partners would "diligently 
en1ploy himself or herself in the business of the said part-
nership." (R. 8). Paragraph 19, provided that all ques-
tions ''as to the Inanageinent of the business" should "be 
decided by a 1najority of said partners." (R. 10). The 
purpose of the partnership, as set forth in the articles, 
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w.as to act as "exclusive sales representative" of all of the 
Smith enterprises, either then existing or to be created 
in the future. Paragraph 2. (R. 7). 
The Smith enterprises were all closely interrelated. 
(R. 40). All of the partners in the Smith Sales Company 
were principal stockholders and officers and directors 
in all of the corporate enterprises. The notable exception 
to this, was that Alfred T. Smith was not .a member of the 
partnership, although he held a substantial interest in the 
corporations. (R. 40). The interests held by the various 
members of the Smith family varied somewhat in the dif-
ferent corporations. The interest of the decedent in the 
partnership, was at the time of his death 24%. (R. 14). 
l-Ie had an 11.17% interest in the Smith Canning Com-
pany; 34.20% interest in Box Elder Packing Corporation; 
3'7% interest in Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., and a 20% in-
terest in Smith Frozen Foods of Oregon. (R. 79-80). 
In brief, the Smith organization consisted of several 
corporations, in three different states, actively engaged 
in canning and processing foods for market. The pro-
duce of these corporations was all sold through Smith 
Sales Company, a co-partnership, which was the "exclu-
sive sales representative." (R. 7). The corporations 
did not employ any salesman, nor did they have any sales 
organization. (R. 67) Smith Sales Company acted as 
brokerage agent in marketing their produce. In essence, 
the corpor.ations were engaged in production; the part-
nership was engaged in sales. (R. 81-82). 
On April 19, 1954, the deceased, in company with 
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Willian1 Robbins and their resp·ective wives, left on an 
airplane trip to various cities in the middle west. The 
airplane was owned by the partnership, (R. 51), and the 
expenses of storage, oper.ation and maintenance of it, 
were paid by the partnership. (R. 56). l\1:r. Robbins was 
the sales manager of Smith Sales Company, and was em ... 
ployed solely by that firm. (R. 30, 45). He was not a 
stockholder, officer, director or employee of any of the 
Smith corporations. His duties related ahnost exclusively 
to selling, .although in connection 'vith that, he htid some 
responsibilities for the procuring of packages and con-
tainers necessary to put the produce in condition to be 
transported to the markets. (R. 45). 
There is no question but what the principal purpose 
of this trip, if not the sole purpose, was to sell a tomato 
pack. (R. 33, 34, 47, 48, 73). As stated by the witness 
Victor R. Smith: 
"* * * our principal object in requesting or 
suggesting that the trip be 1nade, and I might 
s.ay Bill's [Robbins] present reason for insisting 
they go on the trip, 'Yas to contact buyers of to-
Inato products in the east to sell surplus tomato 
products 'vhich we had on hand, and also inci-
dentally to make some contacts one of which, I 
mean, was with the P.I.E. in Chicago incident to 
reviewing some freight rates. * * $" (R. 33). (Em-
phasis ours.) 
To this end, calls 'vere conte1nplated at \Vichita and 
I-Iutchinson, Kansas; Kansas City; Chicago; Austin, Min-
nesota; and Des 1\foines, Io,va. (R. 48-50). All of these 
stops were scheduled for the purpose of making calls on 
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brokerage houses, wholesalers, chain store operators, or 
other potential customers. (R. 48-50). There is no speci-
fic evidence in th~e record that the trip was for .any pur-
pose other than sales. There is a suggestion that the 
parties contemplated stopping at St. Louis, if possible. 
(R. 50, 51). However, the record does not indicate who 
was to be contacted in St. Louis, or for what purpose, 
or even whether such call, if made, would be for business 
or pleasure. Mr. Victor Smith, the witneS's who testified 
as to the proposed c.all at St. Louis, admitted that he had 
no knowledge of what that business would be. (R. 50). 
There is also a statement in the record that at Chicago, 
in addition to contacting potential customers, that Smith 
and Robbins would call on P.I.E. to discuss freight rates. 
Counsel for the plaintiff apparently takes great comfort 
from this fact. I-!owever, a discussion of freight rates 
'vould appear to be a matter of great interest to the part-
nership, the marketing agent, and ~o relate much more 
to its business than to the business of the manufacturing 
corpor.ations. There is nothing jn the record to indicate 
that anything was to be done in furtherance of the pur-
poses of any of the producing corporations. We again 
quote from the witness Smith: 
"Q. So that except for the contact in Chicago with 
P.I.E. the entire purpose of the trip was sales, 
wasn't it~ 
A. Well, these particular companies, yes. 
Q. . Well, were there any other companies~ 
A. No, there was no, nothing definite that wa::; 
discussed." (R. 49-50). 
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There is an abundance of evidence that efforts would be 
made to sell the tomato pack, and other products on 
hand. It is clear beyond question that the prime and 
motivating purpose of the trip was in furtherance of the 
partnership business and not in furtherance of the busi-
ness of any of the corporations of which the deceased was 
an officer. 
At Denver, Colorado, the plane crashed, killing all of 
its occupants. (R. 16, 19, 26). The decedent Smith left two 
minor children, in whose behalf the present proceedings 
are brought. (R. 1). An application for death benefits 
'vas duly filed by their general guardian, (R. 4) upon 
which hearing 'vas had, and .at which the above evidence 
was developed. 
At a subsequent hearing, counsel for the plaintiff was 
per1nitted to introduce certain documentary evidence, 
which he claimed showed that the expenses of S~th on 
the trip were being borne by the corporations of which he 
\vas president, rather than the partnership. This evidence 
is, to say the least, speculative. It consists of a photo-
static copy of a check, dated April 18, 1954, payable 
to the Clearfield Pharmacy in the amount of $200. (R. 
102). A voucher attached to the check indicates that it 
was for travel expenses. Ho,Yever, it does not indicate 
any specific trip. For aught that the record shows, the 
check could even have been in rennbursement for travel 
expenses incurred by the defendant traveling between 
his home in Clearfield, and the corporations' places of 
business in Brigham City. There is also evidence that 
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the deceased carried with him two blank checks of Box 
Elder Packing Corporation, and one blank check of Smith 
Frozen :B-,oods, Inc. ( R. 103, 104). However, there is 
nothing whatsoever to indicate for what purposes these 
blank checks were to be used. For aught that the record 
shows, it may have been the habit or custom of the de-
ceased to carry blank checks of the corporations for ready 
use where needed. Even Melvin J. Stephenson, the comp-
troller of Smith Sales Company (R. 69) would not deny 
that the decedent's expenses in connection with this trip 
were borne by Smith Sales Company. (R. 82). 
Even if it should be assumed, that the expenses of 
the decedent were to be advanced in the first instance by 
the corpor.ations for which he worked, such expenses 
might well have been reimbursed later by the partnership. 
The plaintiff's own exhibits show that there was a con-
siderable amount of interchange of funds between the 
various Smith entities. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc.'s cash 
report, as of April 18, 1954, shows that during the pre-
ceding week withdrawals were made on behalf of Smith 
Canning Comp.any, (in two instances), and also for Box 
Elder Packing Corporation. (R. 101). The cash report of 
the same corporation for the week following indicates two 
payments to Box Elder Packing Corporation. (R. 103). 
The Industrial Commission held the matter under 
advisement for a period of approximately eight months. 
It may be fairly assumed that during this period of time 
the Commission carefully considered all of the evidence, 
from 'vhich it concluded that at the time of the fatal 
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accident, Roland B. Smith was engaged in the service of 
Smith Sales Company, the partnership, rather than in 
the service of any of the corporations of which he was 
an officer. The commission rightly concluded that there 
was no right of compensation as against the partnership, 
because the partnership had admittedly failed to comply 
with the provisions of Sec. 35-1-43 ( 4) U.C.A. 1953, and 
there was no right of compensation against the corpora-
tions, because at the time of his death the decedent was 
not in the course of his employment by the corporations. 
(R. 16-17). A petition for rehearing was duly denied, 
(R. 105-112, 113), whereupon the plaintiff brought the 
instant proceedings in this court. (R. 116-118). 
In summary, the evidence shows without dispute 
that Roland B. Smith was killed in an airplane accident 
on April19, 1954; that at the time of the accident he was 
a general partner in Smith S.ales Con1pany; that Smith 
Sales Company was the exclusive sales agent for all of 
the Smith corporate enterprises; that the airplane in 
which the accident occurred was owned and maintained 
by Smith Sales Company; that deceased 'vas accomp.anied 
by William Robbins, the sales n1anager of Smith Sales 
Company, who had no office, employn1ent, connection 
or proprietary interest in any of the other S1nith enter-
prises; that the prin1e and n1otivating purpose of the 
trip was to sell a to1nato pack; that for this purpose calls 
or stops were planned at various cities throughout the 
mid-west; and there is no specific evidence that any busi-
ness or purpose of any of the corporate enterprises was 
to be served. All of this quite conclusively establishes 
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that at the time of the accident the deceased was engaged 
in the service of S1nith Sales Company, ,and abundantly 
and adequately supports the findings of the Commission 
to that effect. 
THE ISSUES 
As we see it, there are at most two issues for deter-
mination by this court : 
1. Is there substantial evidence in the record to 
support the Commission's finding that the deceased was 
engaged in the business of the partnership at the time 
of his death~ If the court holds that the Commission's 
finding is supported by the evidence, the Commission's 
conclusions .and order follow as a matter of law, and that 
is determinative of the matter. If, however, this court 
finds that the Comn1ission's findings are not supported 
by the evidence, there remains a second issue to be con-
sidered: 
2. If the deceased was in the service of either or any 
of the corporations of which he was an officer at the time 
of his death, was he an "employee" within the 1neaning 
of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, .and are his 
dependents entitled to recover death benefits~ 
POINT I. 
THE FINDING OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
THAT THE DECEASED WAS ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS 
OF THE PARTNERSHIP, AND NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF 
ANY OF THE CORPORATIONS OF WHICH HE WAS AN 
OFFICER, AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH, IS SUPPORTED 
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BY SUBSTAN·TIAL EVIDENCE, AND THE FINDING OF 
THE COMMISSION IN THIS REGARD MAY NOT BE DIS-
TURBED UPON REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT. 
As we understand the position of the plaintiff in 
this case, he contends that there is no substantial evidence 
in the record to support the findings of the Co1mnission; 
that the findings of the Commission are therefore arbi-
trary and capricious, and that the findings should be set 
aside and the order of the Commission reversed. In 
other words, plaintiff contends that the evidence compel'; 
a finding in his favor. We have, in our statement of facts, 
set forth evidence adduced at the hearing, which not 
only amply supports the findings of the Commission, but, 
in our opinion, compels the finding made by the Commis-
sion. 
The scope of review of an industrial proceeding 
by the Supreme Court is set forth in Section 35-1-8±, 
U.C.A. 1953, which in so far as material here, reads as 
follows: 
"The review shall not be extended further 
than to determine : 
(1) Whether or not the con1ITIISSion acted 
without or in excess of its powers. 
( 2) If findings of fact are made, \Yhether or 
not such findings of fact support the a\Yard under 
review." 
This statute has continued Yirtually unchanged in 
the Workmen's Compensation Act since 1921. We also 
invite the court's attention to the provisions of Section 
35-1-85, U.C.A., 1953, 'vhich reads as follo\YS: 
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"After each formal hearing, it sh.all be the 
duty of the Commission to make findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in writing and file the same 
with its secretary. The findings and conclusions 
of the commission on questions of fact shall be 
conclusive and final and shall not be subject to 
review; such questions of fact shall include ulti-
mate facts and the findings and conclusions of the 
Commission." (Italics ours.) 
Although this statute has existed in its present form 
only since 1949, prior to that time, it contained essentially 
the same provisions, although the language was some-
what different. 
These two statutes circumscribe the scope and extent 
of review by this court of industrial proceedings. Al-
most from the inception of the Compensation Act, they 
have been before this court for review in innumerable 
cases, .and this court has unwaveringly followed both the 
letter and the spirit of the statutes. The rule of decision 
was well stated by this Court in the case of Amalgamated 
Sugar Co. v. Ind. Comm., 56 Utah 80, 189 P. 69. It was 
there said: 
"The only question raised and presented to 
this court for consideration is whether or not there 
is any substantial testimony in the record which 
tends to support the finding . of the Commission 
that the death of the said Benson was occasioned 
by accidental causes arising out of and in the 
course of his employment with the Amalgamated 
Sugar Company. * * * 
"* * * It would subserve no good purpose to 
review the testimony in detail which tends to sup-
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port the conflicting theories of the respective par-
ties. In this class of cases, under our statutes, this 
court is confined to a review of the testimony and 
findings of the Commission for the sole purpose 
of detennining whether or not there is any sub-
stantial evidence in the record to support the 
award made by the Commission to the claimants. 
If there is any substantial evidence in the record 
to support the findings of the Commission, and 
the ultimate facts found by the Commission sup-
port the award, we, as a reviewing court, under 
our statutes, cannot do otherwise than enter judg-
ment affirming the award made by the Commis-
sion." (Italics ours.) 
The above rule was restated in substance and effect 
in a long line of cases following that decision: Geo. A. 
Lowe Co. v. Ind. Comm., 56l'tah 519,190 P. 934; McVicar 
v. Ind. Comm., 56 lTtah 342, 191 P. 1089; Globe Grain & 
JJfilling Co. v. Ind. Comrn., 57 l~tah 192, 193 P. 642; Utah 
Ftttel Co. v. Ind. Corn1n., 57 Utah 246, 19± P. 122; Doscolos 
v. Ind. Com1n., 57 Utah 486, 195 P. 638: Tzcin Peak Can-
ning Co. v. Ind. Contrn., 57 r:t.ah 589, 196 P. 853; Moray 
l'. Ind. Comm., 58 Utah 404, 199 P. 1023: Pinyon Queen 
Mining Co. v. Ind. Con~1n., 59 Utah 402, 204 P. 323; Den-
ver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Ind. Cont1n., 60 lJtah 95, 206 P. 
1103; Fonnesbeck v. O.S.L. R. Co., (lTt.) 207 P. 111±; 
llfilford Copper Co. v. Ind. Comm., 61 Utah 37, 210 P. 
993; Alexander v. Ind. Conun., 61 Utah 430, 213 P. 1078; 
M cl( ellar v. Ind. C ont1n., 62 Utah 621, 221 P. 849; Park 
City v. Ind. Co1n1n., 63 Utah 205, 22± P. 655; Hartford 
Acdt .. & Indcn1. Co. ·z'. Ind. Co nun., 6-! Utah 176, 228 P. 
753; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 64 Utah 415, 231 
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P. 442, and Utah Consol. Min. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 66 Utah 
173, 240 P. 440. 
Notwithstanding the oft reiterated exposition of the 
rule, c.ases attacking the findings of the commission con-
tinued to come before the court, and in the case of Adams 
v. Ind. Com1n., 67 Utah 157, 246 P. 364, this court, appar-
ently somewhat annoyed at the need for restating the rule 
so frequently, admonished the bar as follows: 
"Counsel and litigants in these cases should 
understand once and for all that this court is 
powerless to review the evidence except for the 
purposes heretofore frequently declared by the 
court in a long series of well-considered cases. 
* * * 
"This court is now firmly committed to the 
doctrine that it will examine into the evidence only 
to ascertain whether there is any substantial evi-
dence in support of the findings of the commis-
sion and whether it has either acted without or 
in excess of its jurisdiction. * * *" 
There followed another long line of cases, reiterating 
the rule: Standard Coal Co. v. Ind. Comm., 67 Utah 292, 
247 P. 298; Garff v. Ind. Comm., 67 Utah 345, 247 P. 495; 
Rukavina v. Ind. Cornr~t., 68 Utah 1, 248 P. 1103; Chief 
Consol. 11!-in. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 70 Utah 333, 260 P. 271; 
Utah Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ind. Comm., 71 Utah 190, 263 P. 
746; Utah-Idaho Central R. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 71 Utah 
490, 267 P. 785; Fish Lal1;e Resort Co. v. Ind. Comm., 73 
Ut. 479; 275 P. 580; Banks v. Ind. Comm., 74 Utah 166, 
278 P. 58; Combined Metals Reduction Co. v. Ind. Con~rn., 
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74 Utah 274, 278 P. 1019; A.. S. & R. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 
76 Utah 503, 290 P. 770; Hauser v. Ind. Comm., 77 Utah 
419, 2'96 P. 780; Kelly v. Ind. Comm., 80 Utah 73, 12 P. 
(2d) 1112; East hope v. Ind. Comm., 80 Utah 312, 15 P. 
(2d) 301; 1-Iarness et al. v. Ind. Comm., 81 Utah 276, 17 
P. (2d) 277; and Ost.ler v. Ind. Comm., 84 Utah 428, 36 
P. (2d) 95. 
In the case of Leventis v. Ind. Comrn., 84 Utah 174,35 
P. ( 2d) 770, this court again addressed the bar on this 
principle (which had by this time become axiomatic), in 
the following terms: 
"In view of the record and the findings of the 
commission, our course is an open highway, mark-
ed by an unbroken line of decisions which have 
the support of both natural justice and of common 
sense. The principles involved are so limpid and 
axiomatic that their recitation or a citation there-
of would be an adscititious burden. Therefore, 
we move straight toward a conclusion. In all re-
spects the findings are supported by substantial 
competent evidence, which this court can neither 
weigh nor review, as the conunissioners are the 
sole judges of the credibility of the \vitnesses and 
of the weight of the evidence." 
The court used even stronger language in the case 
of Park Utah Consol. ll!ines Co. v. Ind. Contm., 84 Utah 
481, 36 P. (2d) 979. It \vas there s.aid: 
"It seems daft and unjuristic, certainly mala-
propos, that this court should be required to re-
peatedly expostulate with legists about principles 
so well established, and to so frequently reaffir1n 
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that the findings and conclusions of the commis-
sion on questions of fact are conclusive, and final 
and are not subject to review, * * * and that they 
cannot be disturbed unless it appears as a matter 
of law that they are contrary to law and contrary 
to the evidence. We cannot weigh conflicting evi-
dence, nor direct which of the two or more reason-
able inferences ought to be drawn from evidence 
not in conflict. * * * In the determining of facts 
the conclusions of the commission are like the ver-
dict of a jury, and will not be interfered with by 
this court when supported by some substantial 
evidence." 
The court has continued to follow the same rule of 
decision down to the present tin1e. See Vecohqo v. Ind. 
Com1n., 8± Utah 528, 37 P. (2d) 542; Ogden Union Ry. & 
Depot Co. v. Ind. Comm., 85 Utah 124, 38 P. (2d) 766; 
Spencer v. Ind. Cornm., 87 Utah 336, 40 P. (2d) 188; 
Littleford v. Ind. Comm., 86 Utah 46, 40 P. (2d) 231; 
Roberts v. Ind. Com1n., 87 Utah 10, 47 P. (2d) 1052; Ellis 
v. Ind. Comm., 91 Utah 432, 64 P. (2d) 363; Gerber v. Ind. 
Comm., 91 Utah 479, 64 P. (2d) 1281; Babick v. Ind. 
Comm., (Utah) 65 P. (2d) 1133; Pecharich v. Ind. Comm., 
99 Utah 412, 107 P. (2d) 167; W,ilson v. Ind. Co1nm., 99 
Utah 524, 108 P. (2d) 519; Silcox v. Ind. Co1nm., 101 
Utah 438, 121 P. (2d) 901; affirmed on rehearing, 101 
Ut. 443, 125 P. (2d) 428; Bradshaw v. Ind. Comm., 103 
Utah 405, 135 P. (2d) 530; Woodburn v. Ind. Comm., 111 
Utah 393, 181 P. (2d) 209; Camach·o v. Ind. Comm., (Ut.) 
225 P. (2d) 728; Comm. of Finance v. Ind. Comm., (Ut.) 
239 P. (2d) 185; and Edlund v. Ind. Comm., (Utah) 248 
P. (2d) 365. 
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The problem presented to the court in this case can 
be well stated by quoting from the language of this court 
in the case of Peterson v. Ind. Comm., 102 Utah 175, 129 
P. ( 2d) 563, where it is said: 
"In the instant case we are not asked to deter-
mine if there is any evidence to support the find-
ing of the commission. We are asked to determine 
that the probative force of the evidence is such as 
compels a finding contrary to that made by the 
commission. The commission having denied an 
award, found no liability on the insurance carrier 
or employer, we are asked to declare that the evi-
dence requires or compels a holding to the con-
trary; that the findings are so against the evidence 
as to find no support therein; that there is nothing 
in the evidence upon which a reasonable mind, a 
judicious mind could rest in .arriving at a conclu-
sion, and therefore the conclusion must have been 
arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously without re-
gard to the evidence. * • • 
"* * * To be a reasonable conclusion it must 
be one for which from the evidence one c.an give 
reasons which a judicious n1ind would deem wor-
thy of consideration, upon which it would be con-
tent to rest a judgment. In the case of denial of 
compensation, the record must disclose that there 
is 1naterial, substantial, competent, uncontradicted 
evidence sufficient to make a disregard of it 
justify the conclusion as a n1atter of law~, that the 
Industrial Commission arbitrarily and capricious-
ly disregarded the evidence, or unreasonably re-
fused to believe such evidence.* * * 
"* * * If there is substantial, competent evi-
dence to sustain it, then it cannot be said to be 
arbitrary or capricious. * * *" 
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As shown by the authorities above set forth, this 
court has historically been reluctant to interfere with the 
holdings of the Commission, .and has reversed its orders, 
or set aside its findings of fact, only in the clearest of 
cases. One of the leading cases dealing with the question 
of what is necessary to warrant a reversal of the commis-
sion on its findings of fact, was K avalinakis v. Ind. 
Comm., 67 Utah 174, 246 P. 698. The rule there laid down 
is as follows: 
"By what has been said we do not wish to 
be understood as holding that there is no limit 
to the commission's power or authority in dis-
regarding or in refusing to give effect to uncon-
tradicted evidence. The commission may not, 
without any reason or cause, arbitrarily or capric-
iously refuse to believe and to act upon credible 
evidence which is unquestioned and undisputed. 
What we hold is that in case the commission is 
charged with having arbitrarily and capriciously 
refused to consider credible evidence, and we are 
asked to overturn the findings and conclusions of 
the commission which appear to be in conflict with 
or contrary to the evidence, it must be clearly 
made to appear to us that the commission acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously and wholly without 
cause in rejecting or in refusing to give effect to 
the evidence. We cannot set aside a finding or con-
clusion of fact merely because we are of the 
opinion that upon the face of the record the com-
mission refused to give effect to certain uncon-
tradicted evidence. Before we can set aside find-
ings or conclusions of fact, the fact that the com-
mission acted arbitrarily or capriciously must be 
so clear and convincing that but one conclusion 
is permissible, and that we would be required to 
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issue a writ of mandate directing a specific find-
ing of dependency, as we are empowered to do by 
subdivision (d) of section 3148, supra. Any other 
conclusion would make this court merely a review-
ing court with power to weigh the probative effect 
of the evidence." (Italics ours.) 
In the case of Norris v. Ind. Corlim., 90 Utah. 256, 
61 P. ( 2d) 413, this court further refined the principles 
of the Kavalinakis case, and set forth definite criteria 
by which to measure the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the findings of the connnission. The standards 
there laid down, were as follows : 
"Where the matter presented on appeal is the 
question of whether the commission should have 
in law arrived at a conclusion of fact different 
from that at which it did arrive from the evidence, 
a question of law is presented only when it is 
claimed that the comn1ission could only arrive at 
one conclusion from the evidence, and that it found 
contrary to that inevitable conclusion. But in or-
der to reverse the commission in this regard it 
must appear at least that (a) the evidence is 
uncontradicted, and (b) there is nothing in the 
record which is intrinsically discrediting to the 
uncontradicted testin1ony and (c) that the uncon-
tradicted evidence is not 'vhollY that of interested 
witnesses, or, if the uncontradicted evidence is 
wholly or partly from others than interested wit-
nesses, that the record sho,vs no bias or prejudice 
on the part of such other 'vitnesses, and (d) the 
uncont]}adicted evidence is such as to carry a 
measure of conviction to the reasonable n1ind and 
sustain the burden of proof, and (e) precludes 
any other explanation or hypothesis as being 
more or equally as reasonable, and (f) there is 
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nothing in the record which would indicat~ t~at 
the presence of the witnesses gave the commiSSion 
such an advantage over the court in aid to its 
conclusions that the conclusions should for that 
reason not be disturbed." 
The principles and statements of the Kavalinakis 
and Norris cases have been oft repeated and steadfastly 
followed, as illustrated by the following cases: Kent v. 
Ind. Cornm., 89 Utah 381, 57 P. (2d) 724; O'Brien v. Ind. 
Comm., 90 Utah 266, 61 P. (2d) 418; West v. Ind. Comm., 
90 Utah 262, 61 P. (2d) 416; Milkovich v. Ind. Comm., 
91 Utah 498, 64 P. (2d) 1290; Johnson v. Ind Comm., 
93 Utah 493, 73 P. (2d) 1308; Stoddard v. Ind. Comm., 
103 Utah 351, 135 P. (2d) 256; Godfrey v. Ind. Comm., 
105 Utah. 324, 142 P. (2d) 174; Lorange v. Ind. Comm., 
107 Utah 261, 153 P. (2d) 272; Bailey v. Ind. Comm., 
110 Utah 395,174 P. (2d) 429; and Jones v. Calif. Pack-
ing Corp., (Ut.ah), 244 P. (2d) 640. 
Applying the standards of the Norris case to the 
record in the case at bar, we find that at least three of 
the criteria established in the Norris case as essential 
to warrant a reversal of an Industrial order, are absent 
in this case. The first requirement (a) mentioned in the 
Norris case is that the evidence must be uncontradicted. 
vVhile in this case there is no dispute on the evidentiary 
facts, the inferences which may be drawn therefrom are 
at best conflicting, or if they are not conflicting, they 
compel the finding made by the commission. We have 
heretofore in our statement of facts set forth abundant 
evidence, upon which the findings of the commission 
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were based. It certainly cannot be said that there is a 
lack of evidence to support the findings of the commis-
sion, or that there is uncontradicted evidence which com-
pels a finding to the contrary. 
The third standard (c) laid down in the Norris case, 
is that the uncontradicted evidence should not be wholly 
that of interested witnesses, and that the record should 
show no bias or p.rejudice on the part of witnesses, other 
than interested witnesses. The only witnesses who test-
ified in this case were Victor Smith, (brother of the de-
cedent, and also a brother of the guardian and applicant, 
and an uncle of the minor children, for whose benefit 
the award is sought,) and Melvin Stephenson, an em-
ployee of the Smith enterprises. While several of the 
Smith businesses are named as parties defendant, they 
are defendants only in a nominal sense, since any award 
would be borne by the c~mpensation insurance carrier. 
It is patent from an examination of the testimony of these 
witnesses, that it was their desire to present the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the applicant. They were 
called as witnesses for the applicant, .and it was their 
apparent purpose to attempt to make a case of liability 
under the Industrial Act. It cannot be said that they 
were disinterested witnesses, or that their testimony was 
free of bias. 
The fifth requiren1ent (e) established by the Norris 
ea~e is that, the evidence 1nust preclude any other ex-
planation or hypothesis as being more or equally reason-
able. In other words, the evidence 'Yill pern1it of only 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
one reasonable conclusion. If the evidence in this case 
compels any conclusion, it compels a finding that dece-
dent was in the service of the partnership at the time 
of his demise. If the evidence permits of more than one 
conclusion, the conclusion drawn by the Commission is 
certainly at le.ast equally as reasonable as any other which 
may be drawn. Most certainly the evidence does not pre-
clude the finding made by the Commission. 
It is readily apparent that at least three of the six 
elements necessary to warrant a reversal of the Com-
mission's findings are absent in this c.ase. 
We also remind the court that the burden in this 
case is upon the plaintiff to p.rove by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that the deceased was killed in the course 
of his employment as an employee of one of the corpora-
tions. The burden is not upon the defendants to show 
that he was not an employee, or not in the scope of his 
employment .at the time of the fatal accident. The rule 
in this regard is well stated in the case of Bingham 
Mines v. Allsop, 59 Utah 306,203 P. 644: 
"It was incumbent upon the beneficiaries to 
prove that the death resulted from an accident 
arising out of and in the course of deceased's 
employment." 
The rule h.as oft-times been reiterated, as illustrated, 
by the following cases: Hig.ley v. Ind. Co1nm., 75 Utah 
361, 285 P. 306; D. H. Perry Estate v. Ind. Comm., 79 
Utah 8, 7 P. (2d) 269; Chase v. Ind Comm., 81 Utah 141, 
17 P. (2d) 205; Thompson v. Ind. Comm., 82 Utah 247, 
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23 P. (2d) 930; Wherritt v. Ind. Comm., 100 Utah 68, 
110 P. (2d) 37 4; Genera.l Mills, Inc. v. Ind. Comm., 101 
Utah 214, 120 P. (2d) 279; a:o-d Royal Canning Corp. v. 
Ind. Contm., 101 Utah 323, 121 P. (2d) 406. 
We do not understand that the plaintiff takes issue 
with any of the foregoing principles. On the contrary, 
the plaintiff apparently specifically admits on page 19 
of his brief, that the rules are well established and not 
now open to question. However, having stated and con-
ceded the rule, plaintiff in effect nonetheless, seeks to 
overthrow it, or get around it, by a series of arguments 
which we now consider. 
Under Point I, and to a lesser extent, under Point II 
of his brief, plaintiff takes certain of the facts established 
without dispute in the record, and from these argues for 
certain inferences 'Yhich he contends naturally follow, 
and from which he seeks to derive the ultimate con-
clusion that decedent 'vas engaged in the service of one 
or more of the corporations of "Thich he "Tas .an officer, 
at the time of his death. Conceding for the purpose of 
this argument, but without other"ise adn1itting that the 
evidence would permit .an inference that the decedent 
was so engaged, there are, nonetheless, strong inferences 
which point to the conclusion that he "Tas engaged solely 
in the service of the partnership, .at the tin1e of the acci-
dent. 1 T nder our state1nent of facts 'Ye pointed out that 
decedent "ras a general partner, in the partnership; that 
as such, hP shared pro-rata in the profits of the partner-
ship~ that by the terms of the articles of p.artnership, 
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he was bound to devote his best efforts to the business 
of the partnership; that the purpose of the trip was the 
sale of a tomato pack; that none of the corporations had 
any sales organization; that the partnership acted as 
exclusive sales agent for the produce of all of the cor-
porations; that the trip was made in a plane solely owned 
and maintained by the partnership, .and that Robbins, 
who accompanied the decedent, was employed exclusively 
by the partnership as sales manager. All of these things 
point unerringly to the conclusion reached by the Commis-
sion in this case. 
Counsel for the plaintiff argues that bec.ause the 
trip was for the purpose of selling the products of a 
corporation of which decedent vvas president and general 
manager, and that the corporation had some interest in 
disposing of its product, that the trip was therefore for 
the benefit of, .and in the service of, the corporations. He 
argues that if the trip had been for the purpose of selling 
the products of Smith Canning Co., Mr. Victor R. Smith 
would have gone on the trip instead of the decedent, and 
that if the trip had been for the purpose of selling pro-
ducts of the Idaho or Oregon corporations, Mr. Milan 
D. Smith "\vould have made the trip. This is pure argu-
ment and conjecture, and is not b.ased upon any evidence 
in the record. While this line of argument may point 
to a permissible inference, it certainly does not compel 
the inference which the plaintiff draws. Several other 
equally probable inferences may be drawn. It may be 
argued that the decedent made the trip bec.ause it was 
necessary that Victor R. Smith, the managing partner, 
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remain at the home office to manage the affairs of the 
partnership during the absence of the sales manager. It 
may also be argued or inferred that it would not be con-
venient for an officer of the Idaho and Oregon corpora-
tions to come to Salt Lake for the purpose of going on 
a sales trip when there was a Utah resident readily 
available for that purpose. It is also possible that the 
decedent desired to take the trip partially for pleasure 
purposes. In this connection, it is not without signific-
ance that both men were accompanied by their wives. For 
aught that the record reveals, decedent may have made 
the trip because he was the best or onl~-r qualified pilot 
available. There is no specific evidence in the record 
that .any purpose or function of any of the corporations 
was to be served by this trip. Without dispute the trip 
was primarily for the purpose of selling a tomato pack, 
a function exclusively within the province of the partner-
ship. All references to any other business to be con-
ducted on the trip, are at best, vague and uncertain. 
The rule heretofore stated, that findings of the com-
mission upon conflicting evidence are final, applies with 
equal force where the evidence is uncontradicted, but 
conflicting inferences may be dra"'11 therefrom. 
The rule was thus stated in Parke'l· v. Ind. Conzm .. , 
78 Utah 509, 5 P. (2d) 573: 
"This court is not authorized to weigh con-
flicting evidence, nor is it authorized to direct 
which one of t'vo or n1ore reasonable inferences 
must be drawn fro1n evidence 'Yhich is not in con-
flict. That is the peculiar province of the In-
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dustrial Commission." 
To the same effect are Pace v. Ind. Comm., 87 Utah 
ti, 47 P. (2d) 1050 and Russell v. Ind. Comm., 86 Utah 
, I 
306, 43 P. (2d) 1069. 
The language of this court in the case of Sugar v. 
Ind. Comn~., 94 Utah 56, 75 P. (2d) 311, is also apropos: 
"Granting that there is some evidence or 
inference favoring the applicant's theory, yet the 
commission was not bound to adopt that theory. 
It was the commission's duty to decide between the 
opposing theories and inferences." 
Other cases to the same effect are illustrated by 
the follo,ving: Tintic Standard Min. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 
100 Utah 96, 110 P. (2d) 367; Salt Lake Co~tnty v. Ind. 
Com1n., 101 Utah 167, 120 P. (2d) 321; P.ac. States Cast 
Iron Pipe Co. v. Ind. Comm., 101 Utah 580, 126 P. (2d) 
25, and Utah Fuel Co. v. Ind. Comm., 102 Utah 26, 126 
P. (2d) 1070. 
Under Points II and III, of his brief, plaintiff at-
tempts to bring this case within the rule of concurrent 
employment, citing and relying upon Murray v. Wasatch 
Grading Co., 73 Utah 430, 274 P. 940. The facts of that 
case are quite different from those in the c.ase at bar. 
That was not a true case of concurrent employment, but 
rather a case of a borrowed employee. The applicant in 
that case was originally employed by the railroad, but 
was .assigned to duty with the defendant corporation. 
Although he received his wages directly from the rail-
road, the railroad was reimbursed by the defendant cor-
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poration for such vvages, and the employee worked under 
the direction and for the benefit of the defendant cor-
poration. The court there held that he was an employee 
of the defendant corporation. We have no quarrel with 
that holding. We merely observe that the facts bear no 
similarity to the facts in the case at bar. Here, the de-
cedent held simultaneously the position of corporate of-
ficer and director of several corporations, and the of-
fice of general partner in a partnership. He received 
salary from most, if not all of the corporations, and 
divided his time among the several corporations and the 
partnership. l-Ie also received profits from the partner-
ship. The cases are in no wise analogous. 
Counsel also cites .and relies upon several cases from 
foreign jurisdictions. However, it is readily apparent 
that all of those cases involve situations where an em-
ployee was jointly employed by t\YO or more employers 
for the comn1on benefit of both, as for example, a sales-
man representing two different con1panies, or the case 
of a watchman jointly en1ployed by two or more einploy-
ers to care for their respectiv-e property. Such is not 
the situation here. The decedent \Yas separately en1ployed 
by each of the various corporations~ and the partnership 
which he represented. The salary \Yas based upon the 
services rendered to the particular employer, and bore 
no relationship to his con1pensation fron1 any other em-
ployer. 
A case n1ore to the point than any of those cited 
by plaintiff is Ban1.bc·rger F:lectric R. Co. L~. Ind. Connn., 
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59 Utah 257, 203 P. 345. In that case the decedent was 
e1nployed both by a railroad company and a power com-
pany, and spent part of his time oper.ating the railroad 
company's transformers on one side of a building, and 
the other part of his time attending to the power com-
pany's 1nachinery on the other side of the same building. 
There was no joint contract between the two companies 
for the payment of decedent's wages. Either company 
could have discharged the deceased from its employ, but 
neither could have discharged the decedent from the em-
ploy of the other. Each employer paid the decedent ac-
cording to the pay scale of its other employees similarly 
engaged. At the time of his death, the decedent was en-
gaged in working solely on behalf of the power company. 
The Industrial Commission made an aw.ard jointly 
against both the railroad company and the power com-
pany. Upon review, the order was reversed as to the 
railroad company, and it \vas held that the power com-
pany w.as solely liable for the pay1nent of the avvard be-
cause at the time of his death, the deceased was engaged 
solely and exclusively in the service of the power com-
pany, and not in the service of the railroad. 
The reasoning of that case applies fully here. Either 
or any of the corporations could have terminated de-
cedent's services at any time without in any wise af-
fecting his services to any of the other corporations, or 
the partnership. At certain times, he was engaged in 
the service of one corporation and at other times, he 
was engaged in the service of another corporation. At 
the time of the accident he was, as found by the com-
mission, engaged in the service of the partnership, and 
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not in the service oi any oi the corporations. 
Under Point V oi his brief, plaintiff seeks to avoid 
the rule prohibiting this court from weighing the evi-
dence, or the inferences therefrom, under the well recog-
nized exception that this court will review the jurisdic-
tional facts and weigh them independently of the com-
mission. This exception apparently had its origin in the 
early case of Ind. Comm., vs. Evans, 52 Lltah 394, 174 
P. 825. That case was decided under the law as it existed 
prior to the 1921 amendments to the Industrial Act. The 
court there concluded that 'vhere there was a conflict 
in the evidence, as to the facts necessary to give the 
Commission jurisdiction, that such facts could be re-
viewed by the Supreme Court, and that this court could, 
under those particular circumstances, make findings on 
conflicting evidence, contrary to those of the Commis-
sion. The reasoning of the court in the Ev:ans case is 
somewhat nebulous. fiowever, from that decision, the 
rule has been evolved as stated in the case of Angel rs. 
Ind. Contrn., 64 Utah 105, 228 P. 509: 
"Whether or not Skoubye 'vas an e1nploye of 
Angel, within the n1eaning of the Industrial Act, 
is a jurisdictional question calling for a judicial 
determination. * * * It becon1es our dutY~ there-
fore, to detern1ine the facts fro1n a prepoti.der.ance 
of the evidence and apply thereto the la"~ of the 
case." 
The rule has been consistently followed since that 
tiu1c, and "rr do not no"'" question it. See Luker Sand 
& Gravel Co. ~r. Ind. Conz1n., 82 Utah 188, 23 P. (2d) 225; 
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~Veber Co'ltnty-Ogden City Relief Committee v. Ind. 
Comm., 93 Utah 85, 71 P. (2d) 177; Holt v. Ind. Comm., 
96 Utah 484, 87 P. (2d) 686; Miller v. Ind. Comm., 97 
Utah 226, 92 P. (2d) 342·; Stover Bedding Co. v. Ind. 
Con~m., 99 Utah 423, 107 P. (2d) 1027; Rosenbaum v. 
Ind. Comm., 112 Utah 109, 185 P. (2d) 511; Christean v. 
Ind. Con~·m., 113 Utah 45, 196 P. (2d) 502; Sommerville 
v. Ind. Comm., 113lTt.ah 504, 196 P. (2d) 718. 
However, this is not a case involving a dispute as to 
the jurisdictional facts. The jurisdictional facts are the 
facts which must exist in order to give the Industrial 
Com1nission jurisdiction of the claim. They are such 
facts as whether the claimant w.as an employee or an 
independent contractor; or whether the employer at the 
time of the accident had three or more employees in his 
employ, so as to bring him within the ambit of the Act. 
Such is not the problem here. The decedent's official 
connection as a corporate officer of the various corpora-
tions, and as a gener.al partner in the partnership, is es-
tablished without dispute. The question here involved 
is not whether he was an employee, or independent con-
tractor, but whether at the time of the accident he was 
engaged in the "course of his employment'-' of any of the 
corporations. This is not a jurisdictional fact, but a fact 
relating to the merits of the plaintiff's claim. It is a fact 
upon which the findings of the commission, if supported 
by substantial evidence, are final, and not subject to re-
view by this court. See Colonial Building & Loan Ass'n. 
et al v. Ind. Comm., 85 Utah 65, 38 P. (2d) 737. The rule 
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is well stated in Batchelor v. Ind. Co1nm., 86 Utah 261, 42 
P. (2d) 996, where it was said: 
"The Commission having found as an ultimate 
fact that applicant did not suffer any injury by 
accident arising out of or in the course of her 
employment,. and there being evidence in the rec-
ord from which the Commission could have found 
either affirmatively or negatively upon the ulti-
mate issue of fact, we may not disturb the finding 
of the Commission." 
We submit that the findings of the Industrial Com-
mission are amply supported by substantial evidence; 
that conflicting inferences 'vl1ich may be drawn from the 
uncon tr.adicted evidence are not reviewable by this court, 
and that the inferences drawn by the Industrial Commis-
sion from the uncontradicted evidence were reasonable 
and support the decision of the Commission; that this is 
not a case of concurrent en1ployment; that decedent was 
not at the time of the accident in the service of any of the 
corporations of which he 'vas an officer; that there were 
no jurisdictional questions of fact involved, and that 
under the statutes of this state, and the 'veil established 
rules of this court, the findings of the Commission may 
not be disturbed, and the order of the Conm1ission must 
be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF IT BE HELD THAT THE DE·CEDENT WAS 
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEA'TH ACTING IN BEHALF OF, 
OR IN THE SERVICE OF ANY OF THE CORPORATIONS 
OF WHICH HE WAS AN OFFICER, HE WAS NOT AN 
"EMPLO,YEE" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE WORK-
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MEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, AND THEREFORE, HIS 
DEPENDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER DEATH 
BENEFITS. 
Up to this point in our argument, \Ve have attempted 
to establish that the Commission's finding that, at the 
tin1e of his death the decedent was acting in the service 
of the partnership, and not in the service of any of the 
corporations, is supported by substantial evidence, and 
that such finding on the part of the Commission is final 
and conclusive, and not subject to review. In the event 
that the court is in agreement with th.at position, there 
will be no need for the court to consider our Point II. 
However, if the court rules adversely to the position taken 
by us under Point I, we respectfully submit that, even 
though decedent be considered to have been acting at least 
partially on behalf of one or more of the corporations 
of which he was an officer, he was nonetheless not an 
"employee" of any of those corporations within the me,an-
ing of the Co1npensation Act, but was acting in his capa-
city as an executive officer of such corporations, and 
that while acting in such capacity he did not come within 
the letter or the spirit of the Compensation Act, and 
therefore his dependents would not be entitled to an 
avv.ard of death benefits. 
The question of whether a corporate officer, director 
or stockholder is an employee of the corporation which 
he represents, has been considered by the courts of last 
resort of 1nany jurisdictions in this country. So far as 
our research has discovered, there have been no decisions 
from this court on the subject. The holdings of the courts 
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which have considered this question are at considerable 
variance, depending upon the particular facts of each 
case. However, it appears that the general rule to be 
derived from a consideration of these decisions is that an 
executive officer of a corporation, as such, is not an em-
ployee of the corporation within the meaning of the Com-
pensation Act. However, one who is engaged to perform, 
and actually performs as a regular part of his duties, 
mechanical or manual tasks such as are ordinarily per-
formed by employees (as distinguished from executives), 
will not be debarred from recovering compensation, mere-
ly because he is an officer or stockholder of the corpora-
tion for which he works. Connnon examples are as in the 
case of small eorpor.ations, such as small service stations, 
grocery stores, drug stores, etc., where the corporate offi-
cer works along-side the other employees, performing 
exactly the same type of \York and assu1ning the same 
risks. However, where the corporate officer is charged 
principally with 1nanagerial functions, such as general 
supervision of operations, negotiation of contracts, hiring 
and discharging e1nployees, and other similar matters, 
it is ordinarily held that he is not an e1nployee w·ithin the 
contemplation of the act. The rule is well stated by Lar-
son, 'Vorkmen's Co1npensation La\Y, \' ol. 1, page 7 48, 
Sec. 54.00 \vhere it is said: 
"Corporate officers 1rho pe'rfornz only execu-
tive ftttnctions are deenzed e.rc!ud ed fronz almost 
all acts. But a person \\Tho can establish inde-
pendently, on the basis of nature of the \York done, 
1nethod of pay1nent, and subservience to the con-
trol of an 0mployer, that he meets the test of em-
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ployment does not forfeit that status by occuppng 
at the s.ame time the status of corporate officer, 
director or stockholder." (Italics ours.) 
The same author says at page 786, Sec. 54.21: 
"As long as an officer's or director's duties 
are confined to the executive functions associated 
with the office, such as policy-m.aking, hiring and 
firing, negotiating of important· contracts, and the 
like the Compensation Act does not apply." 
The rule is similarly stated in 58 Am. Jur. 678, Work-
men's Compensation, Sec. 150 : 
"While the managing or higher executive offi-
cers of corporations have been held in some in-
stances not to fall within the category of 'work-
men' or 'employees' within the meaning of those 
terms as used in compensation acts, the cases .ap-
pear generally to hold, in the absence of any pro-
vision to the contrary, that the mere fact that one 
is a stockholder, officer, or director of a corpora-
tion does not necessarily preclude recovery for his 
injury or death, as an employee of the comp.any, 
under Workmen's compensation acts, but that he 
may be an employee of the company, depending 
upon such factors as the nature of the work for 
which he receives pay, the proportion of the stock 
which he owns, and whether, in case he performs 
the work of an ordinary employee, such work is 
not merely occasional or incidental, but is his regu-
lar work. But, as already indicated, an officer of 
a corporation is not brought within the operation 
of a compensation statute merely because he was 
engaged in the performance of the work of an 
ordinary employee at the time of receiving an 
injury, where the performance of such work by 
him is merely incidental or occasional, or where 
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there is an absence of the essential elements of the 
master and servant relationship. * * * The fact 
that a corporate officer received no compensation 
for the performance of the duties of an ordinary 
employee, in addition to his fixed salary as such 
officer, has been held to be determinative against 
his right to compensation as an employee for in-
juries sustained while so engaged." 
The cases hereafter cited and discussed are illustra-
tive of the rule. 
In the case of Bowne v. S. W. Bowne Co., 221 N.Y. 
2·~, 116 N.E. 364, an award was made to a claimant who 
'vas the president and majority stockholder of a manu-
facturing corporation. He was its principal executive 
officer, receiving a salary of $70 a week, and receiving 
annual dividends an1ounting to approxlinately $30,000. 
He was injured 'vhile assisting other e1nployees in the 
performance of n1anual labor. In reversing the award 
the Court of Appeals of New York said: 
"Conceding that a corporation may employ 
its officers as 'vorlrmen, to handle lumber, operate 
lathes, or set br.akes, or to act as superintendents 
and foremen, it Inust also be conceded that the 
hJgher executive officers of a corporation are not, 
as such, its enzployees in the ord-inary use of the 
·~vord, nor are they expected to perform manual 
labor. The question is plainly presented 'vhether 
the principal executive officer of a corporation is 
an en1ployee \vithin the definition of the "~ord con-
tained in the \V orlnnen 's Compens.ation La,v. * * * 
The statutory definition speaks of one 'in the serv-
ice' of an en1ployer. In a broad sense the officers 
of a corporation serve it, but in common speech 
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they are not referred to as its servants or em-
ployees. * * * The words of the statute, construed 
in the light of the legislative purpose, do not 
justify the conclusion that the distinction between 
the higher executive officers of the corporation 
and its workmen was obliterated. * * * The short 
title of the .act, the limitation thereof to employers 
employing workmen, the evil to be remedied, the 
method of remedying the evil, the obvious incon-
gruity of applying the law to the principal execu-
tive officer of a corporation as an accident insur-
ance at the maximum rate of not to exceed $20 
a week based on loss of earning povver, - all point 
conclusively to a distinction between such an offi-
cer .and other employees, which the court should 
not disregard. • * *" (Italics ours.) 
To the same effect is the later case of K olpien v. 
O'Connell Lttrnber Co., 230 N.Y. 301, 130 N.E. 301. 
In the case of Leigh Attichison, Inc. v. Industrial 
Comrnission, 188 vVis. 218, 205 N.W. 806, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court said : 
"It may be conceded that the mere fact that 
one is a stockholder, officer, or director of a cor-
poration does not preclude his being at the same 
time .an employee. No hard and fast rule can be 
laid down based upon the amount of stock which 
an individual may own or any other arbitrary 
standard. A study of the cases to which reference 
has been made sustains that. It is quite apparent 
th.at in this case none of the ordinary incidents 
of the relationship of employer and employee ex-
ist. 20 C.J. 1241, and cases cited. * * * 
"We do not, in reaching this conclusion, ignore 
the fact that the corporation is a distinct entity; 
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nor do we reach this conclusion merely because 
she was the owner of a very large proportion of 
the stock issued, but because upon the undisputed 
facts she did not sustain the relation of employee 
to any one. While it is true she devoted practi-
cally all of her time to the carrying on of the busi-
ness of the corporation in the doing of work which 
might be done by employees, that is not control-
ling. The relationship of a person to a corpora-
tion is not determined by the nature of the serv-
ices performed, but by the incidents of the rela-
tionship as they actually exist. 
"The Court of Appeals of the state of New 
York, in a very helpful and illuminating discus-
sion of the matter, reached this conclusion: 'The 
claimant in this case is willing, in order to collect 
a workman's allowance for himself from the in-
surance carrier, to assume a status that he might 
be the first to disclaim for an~~ other purpose. 
Theoretically he was subject to the orders of his 
corporation and w.as liable to be discharged for 
disobedience. Practically he was the corporation, 
and only by a legal fiction its servant in any 
sense.' " 
In the c.ase of Ht.ggins v. Bates Street Shirt Co., 129 
Me. 6, 149 Atl. 147, it was held (under a statute sinular 
to the Utah Act) that while the presideni of a corpora-
tion was not precluded fron1 becoming an en1ployee 'vith-
in the 1neaning of the Con1pensation Act he had the bur-
den of proving that he was such an employee. Here the 
evidence showed that his duties "'"ere siinply those per-
taining to his office, .and that he was perforn1ing such 
duties while injured. In denying an award the court said: 
"When the president of a corporation acts 
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only as such, performing the regular executive 
duties pertaining to his office, he is not an em-
ployee within the meaning of the statutory de-
finition." 
In Brown v. Conway Electric Light & P. Co., 82 N.H. 
78, 129 Atl. 633, the court held that the treasurer and 
general 1nanager of the defendant corporation, who also 
owned over one-third of the stock therein, was not a work-
Inan within the meaning of the Compensation Act. Said 
the Court: 
'~Officers and executive agents do not have 
the occasion for the benefit of the act which ordin-
ary workmen have, and the legislation was not 
passed in their interest. Their need of such relief 
as the act gives is negligible comp.ared with the 
need of ordinary workmen and the latters' de-
pendents. The economic and industrial history 
on account of which such legislation has been pro-
moted calls for no or but slight protection in favor 
of such service." 
In Hodges v. Home Mortgage Co., 201 N.C. 701, 161 
SE 220, decedent was executive vice president and gen-
eral manager of a corporation having no immediate 
superior and being responsible only to the board of di-
rectors. lie was killed while on a trip for the purpose 
of producing mortgages for the corporation. The court 
held that he was not an employee within the purview of 
the Compensation Act. The court stated that executive 
officers of a corporation would not be denied compensa-
tion merely bec.ause they were executive officers, but 
stated that the question turned as to whether the nature 
and quality of the acts being performed were such as 
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would fall within the ordinary duties of workmen. Follow-
ing this decision in the later case of Gassaway v. Gassa-
way & Owen, Inc., 220 N.C. 694, 18 S.E. (2d) 120, the same 
court said: 
"The Workmen's Compensation Act was de-
signed and intended for the relief of injured 
workmen and employees earning a 'weekly wage' 
and not for salaried executives. The title and 
theory of the act impart the idea of compensation 
for workmen and their dependents. Hodges v. 
Home Mortgage Co., 201 N.C. 701, 161 S.E. 220, 
222; Roberts v. City Ice & Coal Co., 210 N.C. 17, 
185 S.E. 438. Executive officers of a corporation 
are not, as such, its employees in the ordinary 
sense of the word and as it is used in the act. . .. 
"We adhere to the dual capacity doctrine un-
der which executive officers of .a corporation will 
not be denied compensation merely because they 
are executive officers if~ as a matter of fact, at 
the time of the injury they are engaged in per-
forming manual labor or the ordinary duties of 
a workman .... 
"To come within this doctrine it is not suffi-
cient to show that an executive officer sustained 
injuries while performing manual or mechanical 
-labor which was no part of his duties .... Nor 
are desultory, disconnected, infrequent acts of 
manual labor performed by an executive sufficient 
to classify him as a 'Yorkn1an 'vhen so engaged. 
The test is, "'"as he at the time of his injury as a 
p.art of his duties, engaged in performing ordin-
ary, detail, mechanical or manual labor or other 
ordinary duties of a workman~ 
* * * * 
"The automobile was furnished deceased as 
president of the corporation. The accident was 
during his working hours as .an executive. No 
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inference that he was engaged as an employee 
rather than as an exeeutive is permissible. As his 
work, as an employee, was only incidental to his 
employment as an executive the contrary infer-
ence is more logical. 
* * * 
It follows that claimants have failed to offer 
any competent evidence tending to show that the 
death of deceased arose out of and in the course of 
his work as an employee. 
"Even if we concede, however, that such death 
occurred at a time when deceased was acting for 
the corporation, still the award cannot be sustain-
ed. The corporation was engaged in building and 
general construction work. The deceased was its 
president, its chief executive officer. The evidence 
gives rise to certain surmises. Treating these sur-
mises as legitimate inferences, the president was 
on his way to High Point to negotiate a contract 
to give estimates of costs, to fix prices and to bind 
the company by contract. In so doing he was the 
alter ego, the voice and the brains of the corpora-
tion. Manifestly such business does not lie within 
the field of the duties of an ordinary employee or 
workman. They pertain exclusively to the func-
tions of an executive. 
". . . Here the deceased was the superior act-
ing on his own initiative as the chief executive 
officer of the corporation." 
In Carville v. A. F. Bornot & Co., 288 Pa. 104, 135 Atl. 
652, the decedent was vice president of a corporation re-
ceiving a substantial salary as such. He was also a stock-
holder. In addition to performing his executive duties he 
1nade himself generally useful about the corporation's 
plant and took part in some manual work. His death re-
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suited from an explosion while telephoning from the plant 
where he had gone to investigate a naptha leak. In hold-
ing that he was not an employee within the meaning of 
the compensation act, the court said : 
"In the present case, it is only necessary to 
say that, under the statute now before us, the term 
'master' was not intended to cover a corporation 
paying a substantial salary to an executive officer, 
or the terms 'employee' and 'servant' one occupy-
ing the position which ·carville did in the organi-
zation of the defendant corporation. That is all it 
is necessary to decide, for this is not the case of 
an ordinary employee, on wages, being used pro 
forma as an executive officer of defendant com-
pany, nor is it the case of one with the title of an 
executive officer but really serving as an ordin-
ary employee, and receiving .a fixed and ascertain-
able compensation for his work as such." 
To the sa1ne effect is Santi v. An~erican Coal Exch., 
91 Pa. Super. Ct. 271. 
A long line of ~Iinnesota cases starting with Donald-
son v. Wm. H. B. Donaldson Co., 176 Minn. 422, 223 N.W. 
772 have also recognized and applied the rule. 
In the case of Benson v. Hyg£en.ic Artz~ficial Ice Co., 
(Minn.) 269 N. ''7• 460, clailnant was treasurer of defend-
ant ice co1npany, receiving a salary of $75 per 1nonth. 
The defendant con1pa.ny 'vas o"---ned by two other eoln-
panies in one of 'vhich the claimant owned 100 shares 
of stock and v;as a director. He "T.a.s injured in an auto-
Jno bile accident 'vhile returning to "7"ork after having 
deposited 1noney in the bank for the defendant con1pa.ny. 
The court held that he was an officer of the company 
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and not an en1ployee and therefore not entitled to com-
pensation. 
In Bendix v. Bendix Co., 217 Minn. 439, 14 N.W. 2d 
465, decedent was president .and principal stockholder 
of defendant corporation. He devoted the major portion 
of his time to sales and executive management, but assist-
ed with installation and repairs when occasion required. 
The court said : 
"The Workmen's Compensation Act defines 
an employee as 'Every person in service of an-
other under any contract of hire, express or im-
plied, oral or written.' *"~ * * But as we stated in 
Donaldson v. Wm. H. B. Don~ldson Co., 176 Minn. 
422, 423, 223 N.W. 772, 773, 'throughout the act the 
purpose to include only workers as distinguished 
from executive officers is apparent. The act has 
in view wages and services.' The underlying rea-
son for excluding executive officers is apparent. 
They do not come within the ordinary accepted 
meaning of the terms 'workman' and 'employee' 
for whose benefit the legislation was primarily 
enacted. They are not generally subject to hazards 
or risks, nor is their compensation ordinarily af-
fected by temporary disability caused by injuries 
received while engaged in their employment." 
To the same effect is Korovilas v. Bon Ton Renovat-
ing Co., 219 }finn. 294, 17 N.W. 2d 502. 
In the c.ase of Macshir Co. v. McFarland, 99 Ind. App. 
196, 190 N.E. 69, the claimant was a director and secre-
tary-treasurer of a small corporation. He owned 49% of 
its stock. He was employed by the corporation as a travel-
ing salesman at a salary of $50 per week. On the occa-
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sion in question, he drove with the president of the corpo-
ration to another town for the double purpose of inspect-
ing a line of merchandise which the company was con-
templating adding to its line and of consulting with an 
attorney regarding a contract. Enroute home, the auto-
mobile was involved in a collision causing injuries to the 
claimant. An award of compensation by the Industrial 
Board was reversed, the court holding that at the time 
of the accident claimant was not acting in the course of 
his employment as a salesman, but was acting in his capa-
city of an officer and director of the company, and there-
fore his injuries were not compensable. 
Another case from the same jurisdiction is Manfield 
& Fir1nan Co. v. ~~fanfield, 90 Ind. App. 70, 182 N.E. 539 
where the facts were as follows : 
Applicant 'vas secretary and treasurer of the com-
pany receiving an annual salary of $6800. He owned 197 
of the 299 shares of stock outstanding. He Yfas injured 
in an auto1nobile accident \Yhile engaged in the services 
of the corporation. The court said: 
"In the case of In re R.aynes ( 1917) 66 Ind. 
App. 321, 118 N.E. 387, the san1e question as to 
who is considered an en1ployee is defined, and 
fro1n that case and cases from other states 've 
can safely say that a person 1nay be a stockholder, 
and even a director, or .an official of a corporation, 
and at the s.a1ne time be an e1nployee and entitled 
to compensation. 
''In order to entitle such person to compensa-
tion in a general 'vay, he 1nust be an employee, 
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whose remuneration is popularly designated as 
wages, rather than s.alary; whose compensation is 
not munificent, who may reasonably be presumed 
to be dependent on his wages for the sustenance of 
himself and family, and whose wife and young 
children may reasonably be presumed without 
proof to be a dependent on him for support; whose 
labor is manual, or of like degree of industrial or 
commercial importance as manual labor when 
viewed from the standpoint of individual accom-
plishment. 
* * * 
''The disinction between employer and em-
ployee is clearly defined in the case of Bowne v. 
Bowne Co. et al., 221 N.Y. 28, 116 N.E. 365, 366. 
* * * 
"In common speech the term 'employee' is usu-
ally not applied to higher officers of a corpora-
tion. In one sense the officers are employees, but 
in common speech they are not referred to as 
servants or employees. • • • 
"In a technical sense, all persons who are offi-
cers and directors of a corporation are employees, 
for the reason that a corporation c.an only function 
through agents and employees, but, when we con-
sider the Workmen's Compensation Act, a sub-
stantial distinction is recognized. 
"Those who own the majority of stock, dictate 
the policy of the corporation, and manage its pru-
dential affairs .are considered in the same cate-
gory as partners in the management of a business. 
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"Manfield and Firman in real essence owned 
this business and managed it in form as a corpora-
tion, but in substance it was their business." 
We recognize of course, that there are many cases 
where an officer of a corporation has been allo-wed com-
pensation benefits. However, an examination of those 
cases will reveal that where compensation has been allow-
ed, the officer has had duties similar to those of other 
employees, and was engaged in such duties rather than 
executive or managerial duties, at the time of the acci-
dent and injury. In other cases, compensation has been 
allowed by virtue of specific statutory provisions not 
found in the Utah Act. Under acts similar to the Utah 
Act, and involving facts similar to those presented to 
the court in this case, the cases hold almost without excep-
tion that the claimant is not an employee within the mean-
ing of the act, and that his injuries are not con1pensable. 
CONCL lTSIOK 
The finding of the Industrial Co1n1nission that the 
decedent was killed while in the course and scope of his 
duties as a general partner of the partnership, and not 
in the scope or course of his duties as an official of any 
of the corporations, is supported by substantial evidence 
in the record, and may not be disturbed by this court upon 
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review. Even if it should be found that the decedent 
·was acting partially in the scope of his duties as an offi-
cer of any of the corporations, he was nonetheless acting 
in an executive capacity, and not in the capacity of ,an 
"employee" within the meaning of that term, as used in 
the Workmen's Compensation Act. The order of the Com-
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4a. 
SMITH vs. INDUSTRIJ\.L COMMISSION - No. 84.55 
~DD:&~DUM TO DEFENDANT$ t .BRIEF 
At the oral argument of the above entitled 
case, this court granted to plaintiff perm1ssio: 
to file a reply brief 1 answering Point II of 
defendants' brief. A copy of the plaintiff's 
reply brier was not served upon the defendants 
until the morning or the argument, and there 
was no opportunity to examine it at that time, 
or to make oral response to the contentions 
therein asserted. However, leave was granted 
to the de:fendants to tile an amendment to their 
brier in accordance witb. the provisions ot 
Rule 75(p)(2), as amended. 
Under Point II or plaintiff's reply brief, 
oommeneing on page 12 thereof, plaintiff eon-
tends that the defendant insurance carrier is 
estopped to deny tb.at tb.e decedent was. an 
"employee" of the corporate defendants. for the t 
reason that the payroll reports on which the 
insurance premiums were calculated, indicated 
that the decedent was · carried ,ae an employee by 
one or the corporations, and that the insurance 
carrier accepted the premiums based in part, 
upon the salary paid to the decedent. The 
plaintiff's arsu.ment in tb.is regard is without 
merit tor the following reasons: 
l. The applicable compensation insurance 
policy became efteotive April l, 1954, less 
than three · weeks prior to the date of the fatal 
accident. There had been no payroll premium 
audit by the insurance carrier up to tbat time, 
and therefore, notbing to give it either actual I 
or constructive notice that the deceased was 
carried on the payroll report as an employee. 
2. There is no evidence in the record 
that the insurance carrier, or any agent there-
of, had actual or constructive notice that 
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SMITH vs • INDUS.TRIA!, 00Mr4IS$ION - No. 8455 
any ot the corporations carried the defendant 
ae an employee etpon their payroll. 
3. The corporation which. did oarry the 
decedent as an eB.IJ)loyee, .listed him as a11 
outside •a.leaman. !he inau.Jtane·e carrier would 
nav·e no way ot knowing tnat he waa, in ta.ot, 
a ee.rporate executive, and not merely a sales-
man. 
A a1m.1la.r ecmtent&on. waa, made by tbe 
claimant in· the .caae ot In·te.rmouatain Speed-
ways vs .• Ind. comm., (Ut .• ), 126 Fac. (2d) 22. 
this C·ou.rt, in denying aueh een.tent.ion said: 
.u* ~: _*lhe taet th;at Sp,ed·wa.TS may 
have ocve·red these tll'·iver• wtth insurance 
on the su.ppos1 tion that · ther were ·employ• 
eee, ma7 have been for :reaao~s of eau tlon 
or a mistaken idea that. tney were Gm• 
ployeee and the acceptance or ·premiums on 
th• · eompensati,on patd cont.e.atants by the 
State Insurance Fund was not a binding 
admiss1.en that it consldered ~them employ·· 
eea OJ? an accept.ance ~-or their status as 
au.c.h • . There is no ab.ow1ng tb.at the Fund 
knew apec1t1cally that px:aemiu.ms we~e paid 
on money paid to drivers op that so know• 
1ng, it intended to inaure. the payrrMtnt of 
compensation to sueh 4r1vere regardl.ess 
o.r · their status .:~· ' . ' ·. 
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